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Legal Constraint of Genetic Use Restriction
Technologies*
Dan L. Burk**

INTRODUCTION
Gene splicing techniques have enabled the creation of
many types of sexually reproducing plants with commercially
attractive characteristics: increased nutritional value,
resistance to drought and pests, herbicide resistance, medicinal
properties, and many other valuable attributes.1 In many
quarters, such transgenic alterations to plant varieties have
been controversial. But even more controversial has been the
application of recombinant DNA technology to restrict the use
of beneficial plant varieties.2 These genetic use restriction
technologies, or GURTs, curtail the saving of seed from year to
year by rendering the progeny of proprietary seed sterile.3
Although the deployment of this technology has for the moment
been restrained by adverse publicity, continued research and
continued commercial interest in its application suggest that it
is a question of when, not whether, the technology will be
deployed.
I have examined elsewhere the conceptual ramifications of
this technology on intellectual property law and policy, and will
not rehearse that discussion here. In this essay, I intend to
focus upon the doctrinal issues undergirding an analysis of
GURTs deployment. Here I examine the public policy factors
* Copyright 2004 by Dan L. Burk.
** Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota.
1. See Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed
Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 268-76 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Martha L. Crouch, Edmonds Institute, How the Terminator
Terminates: An Explanation for the Non-Scientist of a Remarkable Patent for
Killing
Second
Generation
Seeds
of Crop
Plants
(1998),
at
http://www.edmonds-institute.org/crouch.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2004).
3. See id.
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that determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of proprietary
rights licenses that cover plant varieties; I argue that these are
the same factors that would be considered in determining
whether equivalent GURTs usage is legitimate or illegitimate;
and I look at the key American legal decisions that might guide
us in determining the legitimacy of GURTs deployment.
Unfortunately, as I demonstrate in detail below, the cases that
purport to guide decision-makers in this area are poorly
decided and incoherent even on their own terms, let alone when
extended to new methods of plant variety use restriction.
Consequently, we must be wary of any confident
pronouncements regarding the acceptability of, or regarding
the extension of, such practices to GURTs deployment.
I. GENETIC USE RESTRICTION TECHNOLOGIES
The economic challenge that impedes the development of
new plant varieties is that plants naturally reproduce
themselves.4 As a consequence, new varieties are relatively
expensive to create,5 but are trivially inexpensive to propagate
once they are in existence – and, indeed, may propagate
unintentionally. This “public goods” problem of distribution at
a marginal cost close to zero is common in other areas of
innovation, even where the subject matter does not reproduce
itself.6 Legal prohibitions have been the typical solution to this
problem.7 In the United States, trade secrecy and utility
patents have been used to secure exclusive rights in transgenic
plant varieties, as has a specific form of intellectual property
granting plant breeders’ rights. The Plant Variety Protection
Act (PVPA)8 is specifically directed at encouraging development
of new varieties of sexually reproducing plants by granting the
developer broad control over the growth, use, importation, and

4. William W. Fisher, The Impact of Terminator Gene Technologies on
Developing Countries:
A
Legal
Analysis,
in BIOTECHNOLOGY,
AGRICULTURE, AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 137, 139 (Timothy Swanson
ed., 2002).
5. See id.
6. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
7. See generally Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand That Feeds: Toward
Socially Optimal Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1395 (1996) (reviewing legal protection for plant innovation).
8. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000).
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sale of a new plant.9 This statute includes some important
exceptions to a seed developer’s control, such as provisions
allowing farmers to save seed from a proprietary crop,10 or
permitting agricultural research involving the plant.11
However, plant variety owners might prefer that their
control over the variety not be subject to such exceptions.
Patent rights and trade secrecy may also be exhausted or
surrendered with the sale of the protected article.
Consequently, as a condition of access to their seeds, owners
routinely require that farmers contractually waive their rights
to save seed or engage in other legally permissible uses.12
Often the terms of this contract are printed on or attached to
the bag of seed; by using the seed, the contractual “fine print”
purports that the farmer has agreed to the terms.13 However,
it is difficult to police the use of seed and to enforce the terms of
such “seed-wrap” licenses. To do so, seed developers must send
agents out into farmers’ fields to sample crops, looking for
unlicensed users of proprietary seed. When such uses are
found, costly legal procedures may be necessary to halt the use,
force acceptance of a license, or recover unpaid royalties.
The problems of detection and enforcement might be
lessened if seed could be designed to be “self-policing,” that is,
unsuitable for use without the developer’s permission. GURTs
allow for the creation of such “self-policing” seed. Genetic
elements that produce a toxin late in seed development may be
introduced into the plant variety.14 The toxin kills the seeds
after the plant has matured, producing a viable crop for the
farmer, but forcing him to return to the seed producer for new
seed each year.15 Even in the absence of a contractual
obligation not to save seed, the technology makes saving seed
impossible. Thus, the genetically altered seed in essence
carries within its own makeup a prohibition on unlicensed use.
Indeed, the prohibitions embedded in such genetic code
may be quite sophisticated.
In one embodiment of the
technology, it is possible to introduce into the seed a genetic
9. See Aoki, supra note 1, at 284.
10. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
11. See id. § 2544.
12. See Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection for
Plant Innovation: Unresolved Issues after J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 20 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1161, 1163-64 (2002).
13. See id.
14. See Crouch, supra note 2.
15. See id.
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“switch” that will repress, or turn off, the toxin production
when the seed is exposed to a particular chemical.16 This, in
effect, supplies a chemical “password” to activate germination,
which can be used to control the terms of seed usage from year
to year.17 Yearly application of the control chemical, obtained
from the seed owner for payment, would allow the owner to
activate or deactivate seeds in return for prescribed payment.18
One can easily envision other types of switches, sensitive to
temperature, precipitation, soil alkalinity, or other
environmental factors, that could be used to limit use of the
seed to certain geographical regions or seasonal applications.
Indeed, plants could be engineered for various desirable
properties - pest resistance, drought resistance, superior yield,
and so on - and particular attributes activated or deactivated
depending on the price paid by the purchaser.
The description of seed licensing offered above bears an
uncanny resemblance to the history of content licensing in
digital media. Copyright law affords the owners of digital
content some recourse against many unauthorized uses of their
material,19 but copyright is subject to a host of consumer uses
that require no authorization from the copyright holder.20
Owners of digital content, much like seed owners, have long
wished to escape the consumer privileges afforded by copyright
law.21 They have done so through the fiction of the massmarket or “shrink-wrap” license, which purports to restrict a
purchaser’s use of the accompanying product.22 But judicial
treatment of these licenses has been mixed,23 and it is still
extremely difficult for copyright holders to police such
agreements.24 Consequently, copyright owners have begun
deploying sophisticated software “lock-out” systems that
prevent access to digitized content except on the terms dictated

16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or “Shrink-Wrapping”) of
American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 175 (1999).
20. See id. at 175-76.
21. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1266 (1995).
22. See id. at 1241-48; McManis, supra note 19, at 174.
23. See Lemley, supra note 21, at 1248-59; McManis, supra note 19, at
182-83.
24. See Lemley, supra note 21, at 1263.
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by the owner.25
The implications of this development are striking. As both
Larry Lessig and Joel Reidenberg have pointed out, the design
of technical standards confers upon the designer the power to
govern behavior with regard to that system.26 Once constraints
on behavior are built into the technical standards governing a
technology, the technical standards effectively become a new
method for governing use of that technology – in essence, the
technical standards become a type of law.27 Such technical rule
sets may supplement or even supplant the legal rule sets
designed to govern the same behavior.28 The development of
technological use controls, whether in software or transgenic
corn, may substitute private technological rules for the public
statutory rules declared by Congress in the Copyright Act29 or
PVPA.30 Where control over the design of information rights is
shifted into the hands of private parties, those parties may or
may not honor the public policies that animate public access
doctrines such as fair use31 or a “farmer’s exemption.”32 Rightsholders can effectively write their own intellectual property
statute in either software or DNA. Producers who employ lockout technology may in essence become private legislatures,
imposing rules of usage without regard to the broader public
interest that informs democratic rule-making.
Since technical controls can impose conditions that
formerly might have been the subject of a detailed license
25. See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095,
1132 (2003) [hereinafter Anticircumvention]; Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen,
Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 41, 83 (2001); see generally Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the
Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out”
Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1995).
26. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 86
(1999) (the design of Internet technology imposes the behavioral regulation on
its users); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rule Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554 (1998)
(“Technological capabilities and system design choices impose rules on
participants.”).
27. See Reidenberg, supra note 26, at 55.
28. See LESSIG, supra note 26, at 213-30 (describing the interplay between
technology systems and government regulation); Reidenberg, supra note 26, at
55 (arguing the policymakers must understand technology networks in order
to regulate them).
29. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
30. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000).
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
32. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-2544 (2000).

BURK_S8

342

12/29/2004 2:47:16 PM

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 6:1

agreement, such controls might be viewed as equivalent to a
sort of licensing regime.33 But such a comparison to contract
law by no means justifies employment of technical controls that
contravene established public policy.
Carte blanche
enforcement of private agreements has never been the rule in
Anglo-American law.34 When such agreements are found
illegal, unconscionable, or simply in violation of public policy,
they are held unenforceable.35 Because contract law is state
law,36 enforcement of a contract that would violate the public
policy inherent in the federal intellectual property scheme, or
embedded in the Constitution itself, is preempted.37
By the same token, if technical constraints mimic law, it
may be that those mimicking illegitimate contractual terms
should be considered prohibited, preempted, or void. This point
has perhaps been argued most forcefully by Julie Cohen, who
suggests that the coercive power of the state should be
extended in support of technological constraints no farther
than it may be to enforce statutory or contractual constraints.38
Stated differently, where federal law, public policy, or the
Constitution impose limits on the government’s creation and
recognition of property rights in intellectual goods, those limits
would apply equally to both legally and technologically
delineated property.39
II. THE LIMITS OF CODED REGULATION
This equation of technology with law may seem at first
somewhat abstract, so let me offer a fairly clear-cut scenario
that illustrates the problem. Consider for example a patent
license with a term that extends beyond the term of the
underlying patent. The United States Supreme Court has long
held that such licenses constitute per se patent misuse, as an
attempt to extend the patent owner’s exclusive rights beyond
33. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright
and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J.
479, 493-96 (1995).
34. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 158-71 (1999).
35. See id. at 151; O’Rourke, supra note 33, at 529.
36. See Lemley, supra note 34, at 158.
37. See id at 161-62; O’Rourke, supra note 33, at 528-34.
38. See Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management
Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161,
172-79 (1997).
39. See id.
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the period set by Congress.40 This rule has been periodically
vilified by commentators41 and by certain judges42 as
economically irrational, but it remains the law. Even the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
has been notably hostile to the patent misuse doctrine,
recognizes the continued viability of the rule.43
Presumably, then, a license directed to a patented plant
variety, whether that license is a formally negotiated arm’s
length transaction or a mass-market “seed wrap” license
attached to a bag of seed, would constitute patent misuse if the
term of the license extends beyond the term of the patent. The
license would likely be unenforceable on a variety of grounds,
including pre-emption of the state-law contract by federal
patent policy, being similarly void for public policy reasons, and
perhaps even being unconscionable. Indeed, the underlying
patent itself might be held unenforceable until the misuse
constituted in the license was purged.
Consequently, the proper treatment of such a license
seems relatively straightforward: it is unenforceable. The
harder question is whether we would permit the deployment of
genetic use restriction technology that accomplished essentially
the same goal as the license: extending the exclusive rights of
the patent holder beyond the term of the patent. Indeed, the
exclusivity conferred by technological restriction may be far
more complete than that conferred by a legally enforceable
license: legal safeguards are far “leakier” than technological
Where exclusivity over a plant variety is
safeguards.44
conferred by a contract, the purchaser may decide to breach the
agreement, risk detection of the breach, and risk possible
enforcement of the agreement. But technical protections are
not so easily ignored; absent a high degree of technological
40. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942) (“A
patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an exclusive right to make,
use and vend the particular device described and claimed in the patent. But a
patent affords no immunity for a monopoly not within the grant . . . .”).
41. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Note, The Economic Irrationality of the
Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1618-19 (1990) (criticizing the
misuse doctrine on the grounds that the remedy unnecessarily rewards
infringers).
42. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th
Cir. 1982).
43. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
44. See Goss, supra note 7 (discussing the limitations of existing legal
protections).
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sophistication, the purchaser will not have the option of
ignoring an unwelcome, overreaching, or even illegal restraint
on use of the plant variety.45 Consequently, technological
control over a patented plant variety could extend well beyond
the life of a patent.
Note that this outcome could be contrived through a
variety of strategies. Deployment of the GURT itself might
confer an extended quasi-monopoly over use of the genetic
invention so long as the technical protection is not easily
circumvented and the entry of competing plant varieties into
the market is impaired. More likely, the GURT might be
coupled with contractual terms that extend the term of
exclusivity beyond that of a patent. For example, the GURTprotected variety might be accompanied by a license that,
rather than being directed to genetic improvement that is the
subject of the expired patent, is directed to the GURT itself –
GURTs may themselves be patentable, and a license for use of
a GURT-protected variety might effectively capture the value
of a genetic modification protected by the GURT.
The
accompanying license might also be styled as permission to
access the GURT-protected variety: GURTs can be designed to
be deactivated by a particular chemical “password,” and an
accompanying license might purport to trade GURT
deactivation for agreement not to save seed, reverse engineer
the seed, and so on.46
This in turn suggests that the GURT-enabled license could
be styled as a confidentiality agreement or license to use a
trade secret. But treatment of an expired patent as a trade
secret is problematic in a variety of aspects. The Supreme
Court held long ago that state trade secrecy law is not
preempted by Federal patent policy because the two cannot
conflict.47 The Court reasoned that the election to patent an
invention requires disclosure that would obviate trade
secrecy.48 In theory, a third party could follow the information
disclosed in the patent – perhaps with the aid of materials
publicly deposited by the patent holder – to create a competing
version of the variety. But given the extreme concentration of
the seed industry and the barriers to entry,49 such follow-on
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See generally Crouch, supra note 2.
See generally id.
See Kewaunee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
See id. at 490-93.
See Aoki, supra note 1, at 254-55 (noting that ten seed companies
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“generic” variety development may be infeasible. The initial
developer of the variety may be able to maintain a position of
market domination, particularly when locked into such a
position by a combination of technological and licensing control.
In such a scenario, the status of the GURT-enabled license
is unclear. While patent law as a general rule does not
normally pre-empt trade secrecy,50 perhaps it would do so in
this particular circumstance, or perhaps the license would be
found unenforceable on other grounds. If so, perhaps the use of
technology to achieve these same ends would be equally
illegitimate, and fair game for circumvention. To the extent
that circumvention of the GURT is prohibited by a patent
covering the GURT, employment of that patent to effectively
extend the exclusivity in the restricted variety might constitute
misuse.
But in order to reach such a result, the technical protection
must be considered equivalent to a prohibited or disfavored
legal restriction.
This requires sorting legitimate GURT
deployment from illegitimate deployment, which in turn
requires clear direction as to the public policy behind such
exclusive rights. Several cases appear to deal with just these
questions, addressing the licensing of plant varieties under
patent and trade secrecy, as well as examining the interaction
between these forms of intellectual property and the PVPA.
Unfortunately, a review of the cases dealing with such rights
indicates that they are anything but clear on the relevant
policies that might be applicable to GURTs deployment.
III. THE LIMITS OF TRADE SECRECY
Use of valuable plant varieties could, in theory, be
restricted by the law of real property, by withholding the
variety from public access. This strategy would of course defeat
the purpose and the incentive for developing new varieties.
The legal analog to protection by seclusion is that of trade
secrecy; the owner of the variety can legally prohibit or restrict
access to property that is not generally available, even when
restrictions on physical access to that property are not wholly
feasible.51 GURTs allow the variety developer to achieve
control about forty percent of the global seed market).
50. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226,
1243 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that patent and trade secret law can “peacefully
coexist”).
51. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(1), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) (“Trade
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something quite similar, both distributing the variety and
Restriction of plant
simultaneously restricting its use.52
variety usage via GURTs or GURTs-enabled licenses may most
closely parallel protection via trade secrecy, and so the
treatment of plant varieties under trade secrecy may give some
guidance as to their treatment vis a vis GURTs.
At least one U.S. court has held that the genetic
composition of proprietary seed is protectable as a trade secret,
although under facts and procedural circumstances that could
limit the decision’s wider applicability. In Pioneer Hi-Bred
International v. Holden Foundation Seeds, Inc.,53 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a trial court award of damages
for misappropriation of the “genetic message” contained in
hybrid seed corn.54 The defendant, Holden, was accused of
developing hybrid corn from misappropriated Pioneer seed
lines.55 Expert testimony regarding the accused seed suggested
that it was genetically related to the proprietary seed, and
most likely derived from the proprietary seed.56 Holden was
unable to show that it did not derive its seed from Pioneer’s.
Although Holden did show evidence that Pioneer’s seed had
been publicly available on some occasions,57 it did not show
that it had obtained Pioneer seed from public sources.58 The
court held that absent a showing that the accused seed was
obtained via publicly available sources, an inference could be
drawn that access to the seed came via improper means.59
This result is troubling due to the court’s position that
genetic information, even in grain that may have been publicly
accessible, was rendered proprietary by the developer’s
expenditures on confidentiality.60 This result depends upon on
older trade secrecy cases, grounded in the Restatement of
Torts,61 holding that public availability of a purported trade
secret’ means information . . . that derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons . . . .”).
52. See generally, Crouch, supra note 2.
53. 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994).
54. See id. at 1241.
55. See id. at 1229.
56. See id. at 1229-35.
57. See id. at 1236.
58. See id. at 1238.
59. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 35 F.3d at 1240-41.
60. See id. at 1236.
61. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757A (1939) (“One who
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secret is relevant only if the defendant in fact obtained the
This conclusion
information from those public sources.62
probably would not have been reached under more recent
conceptions of trade secrecy law, such as the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act,63 which indicates that information does not qualify
for trade secrecy if it is either “generally known” or “readily
ascertainable by proper means.”64 Indeed, as the court in
Holden itself recognized, and as I have articulated at greater
length elsewhere,65 trade secrecy interpreted in such a manner
may well run afoul of federal patent policy by withdrawing
from the public domain unpatented and unpatentable
information that the federal patent system intends for public
availability.66
The defendant in Holden also argued that the federal
PVPA preempted trade secret protection of the proprietary
hybrid seeds.67 The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument,
stating first that the legislative history of the PVPA showed no
evidence that Congress intended to preempt state plant variety
protection.68 Citing the Supreme Court holding in Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp.69 for the proposition that patent and trade
secret can “peacefully coexist,”70 the appellate court in Holden
implied – alas, without analysis—that the federal PVPA and
state trade secrecy could similarly coexist.71
discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to
the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means”).
62. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012
(5th Cir. 1970).
63. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
64. Id. § 1(4)(1) (“Trade secret’ means information . . . that derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39
cmt. f (1995) (stating that information that is “generally known” or “readily
ascertainable through proper means” by others is not protectable as a trade
secret).
65. See Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology
Licensing, 4 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121, 126-28, 130 (1994); see also
Kewaunee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
66. Burk, supra note65, at 126-128, 130.
67. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226,
1242 (8th Cir. 1994).
68. See id. at 1243
69. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
70. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 35 F.3d at 1243 (citing Kewanee Oil, 416
U.S. at 474).
71. See id.
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The court’s cursory recitation on preemption indeed tracks
the correct form of a preemption inquiry,72 although perhaps
telescoping some steps of the analysis together. Where state
and federal regulations overlap, a court properly asks as an
initial matter whether the statute contains explicit language
indicating Congressional intent to preempt state law.73 If such
language is found, the court must still determine the scope of
preemption, but need not infer intent to preempt.74 If there is
no explicit language regarding preemption, the court must infer
whether or not Congress intended to preempt state law.75
Preemption, whether express or implied, may constitute either
“field” preemption, in which Congress intends to eject the
states from the entire field of regulation at issue,76 or “conflict
preemption,” in which the particular statue at issue conflicts
with some Congressional objective embodied in a federal
statute.77 In the latter case the particular state regulation is
invalidated, although other, non-conflicting state regulations
might be permissible.78 Conflicts are often detected by asking
whether the state statute either “stands as an obstacle” to a
federal purpose or disrupts the “delicate balance” struck by
Congress in fashioning the federal statute.79
In holding that the federal PVPA and state trade secrecy
can “peacefully coexist,” the Eighth Circuit recites a conclusion
that implies conflict preemption analysis. But the superficial
treatment in Holden unfortunately lacks the substance to
actually resolve the question posed; it reaches a conclusion
regarding conflict preemption, but on grounds that sound in
field preemption. Certainly the PVPA contains no express
language regarding preemption, either in the legislative history
or in the statute itself. Turning then from express preemption
to implied preemption, it indeed seems unlikely that Congress
intended entirely to eject the states from the field80 of plant
variety protection – such field preemption is relatively rare and
typically occurs in matters of uniquely national or federal
72. See id. at 1242.
73. See Dan L. Burk, Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity:
A Study in Federal Preemption, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 597 (1993).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 599.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 606.
78. See id.
79. See Burk, supra note 73, at 606.
80. Perhaps an unfortunate metaphor in this instance.
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concern, where there is simply no room for states to engage in
regulation.81 Plant variety protection would not seem to be
such a uniquely federal area, nor is federal regulation so
pervasive as to exclude any opportunity for state regulation of
the matter.
But this does not answer the question as to whether state
trade secrecy law, or even the contract on which trade secrecy
may be premised, stands as an obstacle to federal policy,
requiring application of narrower conflict preemption. This
inquiry is based not on explicit statements by Congress, but by
the structure, purposes, and effects of the federal statute
considered.82 If the state regulation frustrates Congressional
purposes, then the court should infer that Congress intended or
would have intended preemption.83 There exists a very real
possibility that trade secrecy presents such an obstacle. For
example, the PVPA contains an explicit research exemption,
allowing protected varieties to be used in the development of
new varieties.84 The facts of the Holden case involve just such
varietal development.85 Extension of trade secrecy to the
development of new varieties could well block Congressional
intent to further such research. Moreover, the research
provisions exist as a result of the Congressional compromises
negotiated among the parties affected by the PVPA.
Application of trade secrecy could be seen as disturbing the
“delicate balance” struck by Congress among the competing
interests of seed owners, farmers, and follow-on researchers.
Neither is the Supreme Court analysis regarding patent
law and trade secrecy especially helpful—much less
dispositive—where a different statute, embodying different
policies, is concerned. Much of the holding in Kewanee rested
upon the assumption that trade secrecy will never divert
eligible information from the patent system,86 and that the
choice between patent and trade secrecy is binary: information
publicly disclosed in order to obtain a patent cannot be kept as
a secret,87 forcing inventors to make an election between the
81. See Burk, supra note 73, at 599.
82. See id. at 606.
83. See id. at 606-07.
84. See 7 U.S.C § 2544 (2000).
85. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226,
1228-29 (8th Cir. 1994).
86. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974).
87. See id. at 481.
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two. The first part of this assumption is a questionable
hypothesis, even for the patent system. Trade secrecy is
subject to cessation due to independent discovery or reverse
engineering,88 but can in theory last perpetually, so long as the
information remains undisclosed.89 Thus the inventor’s choice
is an election between twenty years of certain patent protection
or perpetual, but less certain, trade secret protection—a choice
that in any given instance hardly can be said to have a foregone
outcome.
But the second assumption of Kewanee—that the election
of protection must be either patent or trade secrecy due to
disclosure—is entirely inapplicable to the PVPA context.
Inventions can be kept either as a patent or as a trade secret;
the choice to patent by definition destroys trade secrecy. From
the standpoint of disclosure, the election is binary, so that only
one mode of protection can be operating at a time, and there is
no opportunity for interference between the two. But plant
variety protection does not necessarily put a varietal developer
to such an election of disclosure or non-disclosure. Indeed, a
more recent case, Advanta USA, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc.,90 rests its mistaken preemption holding on
precisely this observation. Rejecting a PVPA preemption
challenge to Wisconsin trade secrecy law, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that because
the PVPA does not require detailed disclosure, there is no
actual conflict between concurrent PVPA and state trade
secrecy protection of hybrid plants.91
Consequently, the Kewanee rationale tells us little about
whether the PVPA and trade secrecy can peacefully co-exist;
there is no required election between the two. The court in
Advanta failed to consider that the state law might stand as an
obstacle to the purposes of federal statute, and that under the
logic of Kewanee, the lack of actual conflict may signal the
presence of a conflict with Congressional “purpose or
objective.”92 Trade secrecy could well operate simultaneously
with the PVPA to frustrate the function of the statute; and, to
88. See Burk, supra note 73, at 589.
89. See id.
90. No. 04-C-238-S, slip op. (W.D. Wisc. Oct. 27, 2004).
91. Id. at 18-20.
92. Id. Indeed, when combined with the Supreme Court’s result in J.E.M.
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, this result effectively writes the PVPA out of existence.
See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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the extent that GURTs function as a technological equivalent
to trade secrecy, they may do the same. Trade secrecy could
well operate simultaneously with the PVPA to frustrate the
function of the statute; and, to the extent that GURTs function
as a technological equivalent to trade secrecy, they may do the
same.
IV. THE LIMITS OF OVERLAPPING EXCLUSIVITY
The question raised in Holden as to the potential for
overlapping regimes of protection also arises with regard to
patent law and plant variety protection. In the case of
overlapping utility patents, however, limitations will arise out
of horizontal conflicts between the two federal statutes, rather
than vertical conflicts between a federal statute and a state
statute. The permissibility of overlapping patent and PVPA
protection has been addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in the much-ballyhooed decision J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International,93 where the defendant,
accused of saving seed in violation of a patent-based
“seedwrap” license, challenged the propriety of utility patent
protection for plants.94 The applicability of utility patents to
plant varieties was upheld by the Court in an astonishingly
badly reasoned opinion authored by Justice Thomas.95
Although the analytical sins of the opinion are legion, I shall
focus only upon the two most directly germane to the question
of GURTs deployment.
The first of these deals with overlapping intellectual
property regimes. The J.E.M. opinion both assumes and
asserts that intellectual property regimes with overlapping
subject matter are quite routine, even unremarkable.96 To
support this proposition, Justice Thomas relies upon citations
to the Court’s previous opinions in Kewanee Oil and Mazer v.
Stein.97 But these decisions are at best irrelevant, and may
indeed point in the opposite direction from Justice Thomas’
claim. Neither case in fact dealt with overlapping intellectual
property regimes. In Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp.,98 the Court
93. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
94. See J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 128-29.
95. See id. at 145.
96. See id. at 144.
97. Id. (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)
and Mazer v. Stein, 374 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)).
98. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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held that state trade secrecy law is not preempted by the
federal intellectual property;99 but this result was based on the
assumption that the two forms of intellectual property
protection are mutually exclusive: to obtain patent protection,
one must disclose the invention in the published patent
document, thus forgoing trade secrecy.100
Similarly, Mazer v. Stein101 considered the division
between what have traditionally been the subject matters of
patent and copyright – the utilitarian and the aesthetic.102 But
far from allowing the two to overlap, the opinion keeps them
distinctly compartmentalized. The opinion in Mazer is famous
for establishing the rule that functional aspects of
copyrightable works are not covered by copyright.103 Only
aesthetic portions of the work, to the extent that they are
physically or conceptually separable from the work’s functional
aspects, can be protected by copyright.104 And, in order to keep
the two intellectual property regimes separate, should the
utilitarian and aesthetic portions of the work prove inseparable
or inextricably co-mingled, copyright protection becomes
unavailable.105
The inapposite nature of these decisions to Justice
Thomas’s reasoning is not only ironic, but altogether prophetic
with regard to overlapping patent protection for transgenic
plants. The rule established in Mazer has proven to be
exceptionally important for software, which is one of the very
rare artifacts that can be simultaneously subjected to both the
patent and copyright regimes. Copyright has no purchase
impact on software to the extent that it is functional—only the
literal code and non-functional aspects of its structure can be
protected by copyright.106 This in turn allows copyright’s fair
use doctrine107 to provide an effective reverse engineering
99. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 493.
100. See id. at 491-92.
101. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
102. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 211-19.
103. See id. at 218 (“We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for
copyright bars or invalidates its registration”).
104. See id. (discussing the clear distinction between copyright and patent
law).
105. Id.
106. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 130-35 (2000).
107. See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1181-1211 (2000).
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privilege for software.108 Courts have held that the creation of
intermediate or temporary copies, made in the course of
accessing uncopyrighted and unprotectable aspects of the
program, is fair use.109
To the extent that patent law may be available to protect a
computer program’s functional aspects, it may serve to override
or negate this reverse engineering privilege.110 Patent law
includes no fair use provision,111 nor indeed much else in the
way of user privileges or exemptions.112 This has been a source
of concern to commentators reviewing the state of the software
industry,
as
software
innovation
depends
upon
interoperability,113 and patents may serve to block the
development of interoperable products.114 The introduction of a
fair use doctrine, or its equivalent, into patent law has been
suggested to alleviate this problem.115
The negation of exemptions and privileges by overlapping
patent protection in software is precisely the same problem
elided by the Court in J.E.M.;116 and this leads us to the second
key analytical flaw in the opinion. Much of the holding in
J.E.M. rested upon the questionable conclusion that the patent
and PVPA statutes are in some fashion compatible,117 so that
no inference might be drawn that Congress did not intend the
two statutes to overlap.118 But in fact this conclusion of
108. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in
the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 3, 17 (2001).
109. See O’Rourke, supra note 107, at 1220-21 (citing Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) and Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)).
110. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 108, at 17-21.
111. See id. at 6.
112. See id. at 6.
113. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 1093.
114. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 108, at 5-6.
115. See id. at 37; O’Rourke, supra note 107, at 1230-35; see also Burk,
supra note 106, at 151-58.
116. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124,
140 (2001).
117. See id. at 140-41.
118. And indeed, when combined with cases holding that there is no
conflict between the overlap of PVPA and trade secrecy essentially reads
PVPA out of existence: if a plant developer has the election between robust
patent protection for 20 years, or perpetual protection under trade secrecy, it
is difficult to see when he would ever opt for PVPA protection that is shorter
than trade secrecy and weaker than patent. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text. Some commentators have suggested that PVPA is indeed
unnecessary and redundant. See generally Mark D. Janis and Jay P. Kesan,
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compatibility is blatantly wrong in a number of respects,
particularly in that patent protection is entirely incompatible
with the research and farmer’s exemptions in the PVPA. The
overlay of patent law onto PVPA subject matter negates these
exemptions in the same fashion that patent protection
overrides the reverse engineering exemption for software.
Whatever public benefit or constituent balance Congress
intended for the exemptions is thus lost, much as it would be
with the overlay of GURTs upon plant varieties.
This problem is not new to Supreme Court jurisprudence;
indeed, overlapping intellectual property protection has posed a
problem in a variety of situations where one form of intellectual
property threatens to disrupt the substantive limits or policy
balance of another. Instead of looking to the inapposite
Kewanee Oil and Mazer decisions, the Court in J.E.M. might
better have looked to Supreme Court precedent in the area of
trademark law, where the court has repeatedly expressed its
concern that overlapping patent and trademark protection not
be permitted to disrupt federal patent policy.119 While the term
of patent protection has been carefully limited by Congress,120
trademark or trade dress protection can last as long as the
owner of the mark continues to use it in commerce –
theoretically forever.121
The Court has repeatedly held that one form of intellectual
property cannot be used to subvert the limits of another. In
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,122 the Court held that
consumer recognition of a distinctively shaped “shredded
wheat” biscuit could not be used under law of trademark to
extend a patent owner’s rights beyond the term of the patent on
the biscuit.123 The Court reaffirmed that principle with regard
to distinctively shaped traffic sign assemblies in Traffix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.124 – a case decided just
U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury . . .?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727
(2002). But the statute does exist, and until Congress repeals it, demands
that the intellectual property system should be envisioned so as to give it
effect.
119. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65
(1995) (explaining patent concerns underlying the trademark functionality
doctrine).
120. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2000).
122. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
123. See id. at 119-20.
124. 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001).
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before J.E.M., but curiously not mentioned in the opinion. The
principle is not limited to patent law; in Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,125 the Court held that
documentary films for which copyright had lapsed could not be
protected under the Lanham Act’s false designation of origin
provision.126 The reasoning in J.E.M. sits uncomfortably amid
these decisions, offering little indication that the confluence of
patent and PVPA protection is more acceptable than the
confluence of patent and trademark, or copyright and
trademark.
V. THE LIMITS OF SEEDWRAP LICENSING
The question of overlapping patent and PVPA protection in
turn implicates the licensing of patented plant varieties. The
jurisprudence of utility patent licensing for plants could closely
parallel the employment of GURTs and GURTs-enabled
licenses for plants, either because the technological protection
confers exclusivity analogous to patent protection, or because
the GURT itself is patented, and tampering with it may trigger
patent liability. Patent rights are extensive, but they are not
unlimited, and their exercise may be constrained by the
doctrines
of
exhaustion,
misuse,
or
by
antitrust
considerations.127 These doctrines might similarly be recruited
to constrain analogous GURTs deployment.
The limitations on patent “seedwrap” licensing have been
addressed in the Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling I)128
litigation, another lawsuit dealing with seed saved in violation
Prominent among defendant
of a “seedwrap license.”129
McFarling’s arguments against the enforceability of the license
was that of patent exhaustion: the patentee’s loss of right in a
particular patented item after it is sold.130 Patent exhaustion
is often compared to the first sale doctrine in copyright,131 as
each constitutes a mechanism of a more general policy
disfavoring restraints on alienation.
In each case, an
125. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
126. See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 38.
127. Id. at 662-63; United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52,
(1942).
128. 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
129. See McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1294.
130. See id. at 1298.
131. ROBERT E. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1023 (3d ed. 2002).
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intellectual property owner’s rights in the physical object sold
to another are exhausted, although the intellectual property
rights in the intangible work remain. In the particular case of
patent exhaustion, the patent owner’s rights to a particular
embodiment of the claimed invention are exhausted after
transfer, although he may still hold the right to prevent
making, use, sale, offering for sale, or importation of the
claimed invention.132
But patent law differs from copyright in an important
respect. In copyright, the division between the exclusive rights
in the work and the right to dispose of the copy are relatively
pristine. Copyright excludes only certain uses of the tangible
copy,133 and first sale speaks to only one of these, the right of
distribution.134 But unlike copyright’s first sale doctrine,
patent law’s exhaustion doctrine is entangled with the
exclusive rights of the patent owner, which include the right to
exclude all uses.135 Thus, sale of a patented item is typically
assumed to entail a license for the normal and customary “use”
of the product – the purchaser would be highly unlikely to
purchase a product which he was excluded from using in any
manner whatsoever.
In challenging the Monsanto “seedwrap” agreement,
McFarling argued that Monsanto’s rights in the seeds and their
progeny were exhausted upon sale of the seed.136 The Federal
Circuit looked to their recent jurisprudence holding that patent
exhaustion can be negated by explicit terms in the sale or
license of the patented product, reasoning that the restrictions
in the “seedwrap” license covered the seeds actually sold, and
that the sale of the seeds conferred no implicit or explicit
license to “construct new seeds.”137 Further, the court held that
the new, second generation seeds themselves were not subject
to exhaustion, because they were not sold to MacFarling, but
were “made” by him from the first generation seeds that were

132. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1942);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 279 (1942); Intel Corp. v. ULSI
Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
134. See id. § 109(a).
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
136. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter McFarling I].
137. See id. at 1298-99 (citing B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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sold.138
This analysis is at best confused, failing to separate the
interconnected issues raised by McFarling’s claim. The Federal
Circuit plausibly answers the question as to whether the
patent holder’s rights in the first generation seed were
exhausted, but simultaneously sidesteps the question of
whether the patent holder’s rights in the second generation
seeds were exhausted.
It is simply contradictory and
nonsensical for the court to state that the sale conferred only
the right to use the original seeds, and that the “original sale of
the seeds did not confer a license to construct new seeds.”139
Using the original seeds necessarily entails the construction of
new seeds; that is how seeds work. Soybeans in particular
would be worthless if the license to use them did not confer a
license to “construct new seeds”; i.e., a second generation of
soybeans to be harvested. Although this may not necessarily
be true of some other plants, such as cotton or flax, where the
plant itself, rather than its seeds, is the desired product.140 But
in the case of soybeans, the sale of the initial seeds must
necessarily confer a license to “construct new seeds.” There is
no other reason for the farmer to have purchased them.
Consequently, the question cannot be what usage
constraints were placed upon the first generation seeds –
clearly they were to be used to generate additional seeds. The
question is rather the legitimacy of the constraints imposed in
the contract for sale of the first generation seeds upon the use
of the second generation seeds, constraints requiring the
purchaser to use the second generation seeds for food or
another end product, and not for planting. This is clearly a
matter of imposing terms upon the purchaser of one product
regarding another product not yet in existence at the time of
the first product’s sale. Stated differently, the legitimacy of the
transaction depends upon whether the license for the use of the
first generation seeds can permissibly “reach through” to
constrain the use of the second generation seeds.
The court seems to have realized this mistake, at least in
part, in its subsequent McFarling II opinion addressing
McFarling’s appeal from summary judgment, in which
McFarling claimed that the terms of the license constituted a
patent misuse, tying a license for the first generation seeds to a
138. See id. at 1299.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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license for the second generation seeds.141 There the Federal
Circuit acknowledged that McFarling would plant and harvest
the first-generation seeds in the identical fashion, whether he
planned to replant the second generation seed or not;142
consequently, the license must be imposing a prohibition on the
use of the second generation seed rather than on the first
However, the court sidestepped the
generation seed.143
applicability of such a license to the second generation seeds,
reasoning that since they must necessarily fall within the
patent claims, a prohibition on their use fell within the scope of
the patent.144 Hence, the prohibition could not constitute
misuse.
It is worth noting that the use of upstream patent licenses
to constrain use of downstream products has become an issue of
concern in other technologies, particularly in the
pharmaceutical industry, where some commentators have
suggested that the practice implicates both antitrust and
patent misuse.145 In the case of patented seed licenses, the
analysis is somewhat more complex; as the court noted in
McFarling II, the derived product will always fall within the
scope of the patent,146 which may or may not be the case with
research products. But even though the second generation
seeds saved by McFarling fell within the scope of the Monsanto
patent, this does not answer the question as to whether the
licenses for the first and second generation seeds were tied, let
alone whether they were impermissibly tied. The analysis I
have reviewed here demonstrates that a constraint on the use
of the second generation seeds would constitute at least partial
revocation of the implied license to use the second generation
seeds, arising out of the license for the first generation seeds.
If the licenses for each type of seed use can be said to function
in different markets, and Monsanto’s market power in the
market for first generation seeds is being used to leverage
market power in the market for second generation seeds, then
an argument for antitrust violation is at least feasible—and
antitrust violations are per se misuse.
141. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter McFarling II].
142. See id. at 1342.
143. See id. at 1342-43.
144. See id. at 1343.
145. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for
Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 439-49 (2003).
146. See McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1343.
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The court in McFarling I rejected such claims as unproven,
but this holding was primarily an evidentiary matter, without
any serious analysis as to the dimensions of the relevant
markets and Monsanto’s market power in those markets.147 In
an increasingly consolidated seed industry, the concomitant
concentration of patents and market power in the hands of a
very few firms deserves more serious scrutiny. Under such
conditions, the technological “lock-out” effect of GURTs may be
even greater than those of exclusive rights under patent law. I
have suggested elsewhere that anticompetitive conduct and
misuse constraints ought to apply in the context of digital
rights management,148 and they could equally well prove
applicable in some situations of GURTs deployment.
CONCLUSION
Deployment of genetic use restriction technologies raises
serious policy concerns over the substitution of private
technological regimes for publicly enacted legal regimes. The
key cases regarding the application of patent, trade secrecy,
and attendant licenses are analytically muddled even on their
own facts, and offer dubious guidance outside their specific
holdings. Indeed, these cases leave open and unanswered
numerous serious questions about the routine deployment of
“seedwrap” licenses and about the intellectual property regimes
applicable to transgenic plant varieties, let alone any new or
more exotic set of issues. Extending the results of such cases to
technological substitutes is highly problematic, leaving the
legal propriety of GURTs deployment in substantial doubt for
the foreseeable future.

147. McFarling I, 302 F.3d 1291,1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
148. See generally Anticircumvention, supra note 25.

